Abstract
The United States (U.S) military buildup in South America and the Caribbean under Trump’s second administration - largest military buildup in the region in over six decades, a deployment unmatched since the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis - occured amidst a shifting geopolitical dynamics, as a new world order is taking shape. This move signals an aggresive effort by Washington to reassert a more dominant role in the Western Hemisphere. This renewed strategic focus on South America and the Caribbean is formally codified in the recently published U.S. National Security Strategy, which explicitly reaffirms the principles of the Monroe Doctrine as a cornerstone of contemporary American foreign policy in the region.
This analysis examines the hypothetical U.S. invasion of Venezuela and the capture of President Nicolás Maduro on 03 January 2026 as a pivotal event in 21st-century geopolitics. It argues that the intervention, while justified by the Trump administration under a revived Monroe Doctrine focused on counter-narcotics and regional security, fundamentally represents a strategic move to reassert U.S total dominance of the western hemisphere and control global energy security, and a direct response to the influence of rival global powers in South America and the Caribbean - notably China and Russia - whose significant economic investments and military partnerships with Caracas had turned Venezuela into a geostrategic foothold threatening U.S. primacy. By removing the Maduro regime, the U.S seeks not only to secure the world's largest oil reserves but also to dismantle an alternative sphere of influence, sending a stark warning about the risk of projecting power at U.S backyard (South America and the Caribbean). The article concludes that this U.S military action, though a short-term demonstration of unilateral power, is motivated by energy security and global power dominance due to the rise of re-rise of Russia and the rise of China as global powers. This invasion risks triggering prolonged regional instability and insecurity, regional alienation, and a new era of intensified great-power competition, ultimately undermining the long-term security and energy objectives it claims to achieve.
Key Concepts: Geostrategic Foothold; Geopolitics; Global Energy Security; Great-power Competition; Military Buildup; Monroe Doctrine; Regional Security; U.S. National Security Strategy; U.S. Primacy; Western Hemisphere.
In the early hours of 03 January 2026, the geopolitical landscape of the Western Hemisphere was violently reshaped as the U.S conducted a military operation in Venezuela, culminating in the capture of President Nicolás Maduro and his wife - a direct assault on the sovereignty of one of the major oil-rich nations in the world and a violation of International Law. This dramatic escalation, framed by Washington as a counter-narcotics operation but denounced by Caracas as an oil grab, marks a pivotal moment in the interplay between military power, energy security, and regional hegemony in a shifting geopolitical landscape (Angell, 2025, p. 4).
The Path to the Invasion: Military Buildup and Propaganda War
The 03 January 2026 strikes were not a spontaneous act but the culmination of a deliberate, months-long pressure campaign by the Trump administration to topple the Maduro government. Since August 2025, the U.S. had orchestrated a significant military buildup in the Caribbean Sea, deploying a hybrid fleet under Operation Southern Spear to combat alleged drug trafficking (Radio Canada International 2025). This force grew to include the USS Gerald R. Ford aircraft carrier strike group, the USS Iwo Jima amphibious ready group, and thousands of Marines and sailors, effectively establishing a naval blockade of Venezuela.
Prior to the invasion, the U.S conducted a significant military buildup in the region. In August, approximately 2,200 Marines from the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit deployed to the Caribbean aboard the Iwo Jima Amphibious Ready Group. In September, a force of ten F-35 fighter jets arrived in Puerto Rico, accompanied by hundreds of ground support personnel. Special operations missions were launched from the afloat staging base MV Ocean Trader, which served as a "mothership" for an estimated 150 special operations troops. Furthermore, the USS Gerald R. Ford Carrier Strike Group arrived, contributing a force of about 4,500 Navy sailors from the aircraft carrier itself, with each of its three escorting destroyers carrying an additional 320 personnel (Center for Strategic & International Studies 2025).
The administration's public justification centred on Venezuela's alleged role as a narco-state. President Trump had repeatedly threatened to move from striking alleged drug boats at sea—a campaign that reportedly destroyed over 35 vessels and killed at least 115 people—to hitting targets on Venezuelan land. In late December 2025, the U.S. acknowledged its first known direct operation on Venezuelan soil, a CIA-led drone strike on a docking area, setting the stage for the full-scale invasion (Radio Canada International 2025). On 13 November 2025, the U.S Secretary of defence announced the start of Operation Southern Spear, a mission to defend the homeland and remove narco-terrorists from its sphere of influence. The operation was led by U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) and a new joint task force created in October 2025. The announcement followed the arrival of the Gerald R. Ford carrier strike group (CSG) in the Caribbean on 11 November 2025. After ten weeks of strikes on suspected drug boats - which killed at least 80 people - and three months of military buildup, the Trump administration's Caribbean Campaign entered a new phase as the campaign began with intense attacks on boats suspected of smuggling drugs. These strikes formed the cutting edge of the ongoing operations. The first attack took place on 02 September 2025 in the Caribbean. Since then, the frequency of these attacks increased, and expanded into the Eastern Pacific (Center for Strategic & International Studies 2025).
The Invasion and Capture of the Venezuelan President and his wife.
At approximately 2:00 a.m. local time on 03 January 2026, Caracas was hit by at least seven large explosions followed by low-flying aircraft as part of air invasion. Venezuela’s key military installations such as Fort Tiuna (the main military base in Caracas), La Carlota military airfield, Generalissimo Francisco de Miranda Air Base, and Higuerote Airport were hit. Venezuelan Defence Minister Vladimir Padrino López stated that U.S combat helicopters fired rockets and missiles in urban areas. The Federal Aviation Administration immediately banned U.S. aircraft from Venezuelan airspace, citing ongoing military activity (Angell, 2025). The peak of the operation was revealed by President Trump on Truth Social at 5:21 a.m. as he stated that Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, had been captured and flown out of the country. U.S. officials told CBS News that the elite Army Delta Force unit successfully conducted the capture mission. Venezuelan Vice President Delcy Rodríguez confirmed the couple was missing and demanded proof of life. In response, the Maduro government declared a state of emergency and called for national mobilization against imperialist aggression (CNN, 2025). There are always motivations for oging to war. The U.S invasion of Venezuela on 03 Jnaury 2026 is theefore not an exception.
Geopolitical Motivations: Beyond Anti-Narcotics War to Implementing the Monroe Doctrine.
Energy security is a critical dimension in contemporary geopolitical landscape, where the availability, affordability, control and uninteruppted supply of energy resources play a pivotal role in shaping geopolitical dynamics and national policies leading to an interplay between energy security, geopolitics, and policies on the global stage. The quest for energy security is inherently linked to geopolitical landscape, as states strategically position themselves to secure access to vital energy resources. The competition to control energy reserves, transit routes, choke holds and distribution networks often shapes international relations, leading to geopolitical tensions and conflicts (Ibekwe, K.I, et al. 2024). Venezuelan oil forms an important part of this energy security dynamics marred by geopolitical complexity. Trump’s impulsively aggressive behaviour could be explained by understanding the Monroe Doctrine.
What is the Monroe Doctrine?
The Monroe Doctrine, articulated by President James Monroe in his December 1823 address to Congress (Figure 1), fundamentally shaped U.S. foreign policy by declaring the Western Hemisphere off-limits to European colonization or political interference. While conceived to safeguard the sovereignty of newly independent USA, the doctrine established the region as a U.S. sphere of influence that must be protected and preserved at all costs.
The Monroe Doctrine, formulated by President James Monroe in 1823, established a foundational U.S. policy toward the newly independent nations of Latin America. Its core principles asserted distinct spheres of influence for the Americas and Europe, opposed any new European colonization, and forbade European intervention in hemispheric affairs. Initially, U.S. enforcement relied on the tacit backing of the British Royal Navy. As U.S. national power grew through the 19th century, so did its capacity to act on this doctrine. Following the Mexican - American War (1846-48), which expanded U.S. territory, the policy evolved from a defensive principle into a rationale for proactive intervention. President Theodore Roosevelt’s 1904 Roosevelt Corollary explicitly recast the United States as the hemisphere's international police power, leading to repeated military occupations in Cuba, Nicaragua, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic to secure U.S. strategic and financial interests.
This era of gunboat diplomacy was paralleled by dollar diplomacy, which sought to create financial dependency through capital investment and control over national revenues. A prime example was the U.S.-orchestrated support for Panamanian independence from Colombia to secure canal construction rights. As scholar P. Bastos notes, these financial protectorates often required sustained military force to maintain political order and ensure the extraction of fiscal surpluses for American creditors, fundamentally disregarding the sovereignty of the colonised states (Pires and Nascimento 2020).
The application and interpretation of the doctrine evolved significantly, often extending beyond its original intent. In 1865, the United States invoked it to support Mexican President Benito Juárez against a French-imposed monarchy. Decades later, President Theodore Roosevelt expanded its scope through his 1904 Roosevelt Corollary, which asserted a U.S. right to exercise international police power in the hemisphere. This reinterpretation justified numerous U.S. military interventions in Latin America in the early 20th century, including in Nicaragua where on December 20, 1989, U.S. troops under President George H.W. Bush launched a surprise invasion of Panama, known as Operation Just Cause. The invasion was justified by allegations that the nation's leader, Manuel Noriega, conspired with drug traffickers to funnel cocaine into the United States and had manipulated that year's presidential election. The stated objectives were to restore the democratically elected government and arrest Noriega on drug charges. The conflict resulted in significant casualties, with 23 U.S. service members killed and 320 wounded; Panamanian losses were estimated at over 500 military personnel and civilians. In 1992, Noriega was convicted in a U.S. court on drug trafficking charges and sentenced to 40 years in prison (BBC 2019, The Guardian 2025). The doctrine’s most critical modern test occurred in 1962 during the Cuban Missile Crisis when President John F. Kennedy framed the Soviet Union’s deployment of missiles in Cuba as a direct violation of the Monroe Doctrine and a threat to U.S security and survival. With regional support, his naval blockade of Cuba compelled the Soviet Union to withdraw the missiles, cementing the doctrine’s enduring symbolic role in U.S. national security policy (The U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, 2022).
While the Trump administration publicly anchored its actions in the war on drugs, analysts and the Venezuelan government pointed to deeper geostrategic and economic drivers. In a statement, Venezuela’s government accused the U.S. of seeking to seize control of Venezuela’s strategic resources, in particular its oil and minerals (Angell, 2025). This aligns with analysis from RBC Capital Markets, which, weeks before the invasion, predicted a U.S.-led regime change operation was likely in early 2026 (RBC Capital Markets, 2025). The report stated that proponents of removing Maduro saw Venezuela as a base for Russian and Chinese influence, aiming for regime change to reassert U.S. dominance in the region - a policy linked to Trump's version of the Monroe Doctrine (Trump Corollary). Additionally, Lower global oil prices, partly achieved through U.S. shale production, provided Washington with greater latitude to pursue such coercive strategies against petro-states without fearing a massive price spike at home (Friedman 2025).
U.S Energy Security Needs: Why Trump wants access to Venezuela's oil.
Despite being the world's largest oil producer, the United States has a critical dependency on foreign oil due to a mismatch between the type of crude it produces and what its refineries require. The U.S predominantly extracts light crude, while the majority of its major refineries are configured to process heavy crude into gasoline and other fuels. Retrofitting these refineries to handle light crude would cost tens of billions of dollars, an economically unproductive investment. Consequently, even with record domestic production, the U.S. remains reliant on imports to supply its refineries, particularly those on the Gulf Coast, with over six thousand barrels per day of heavy crude. This structural dependence brings strategic focus to Venezuela (Institute for Energy Research 2018).
The recent expansion of U.S. oil production has faced significant infrastructure constraints, particularly a shortage of pipeline capacity to transport crude from major shale plays like the Permian Basin in Texas and the Bakken formation in North Dakota. To overcome this bottleneck in the Permian, producers have employed alternative transportation methods, such as rail and trucks, and utilized drag reduction agents to maximize the flow within existing pipelines. This challenge was partially mitigated by the earlier-than-expected commissioning of new pipelines with anticipation of further expansion (Institute for Energy Research 2018).
The completion of three major pipelines—the Gray Oak, Cactus II, and Epic systems—between mid-2020 and early 2021 was projected to add nearly 2 million barrels per day of new takeaway capacity from the Permian (Institute for Energy Research 2018). In anticipation of this new infrastructure, oil companies drilled but deferred the completion of many wells, creating a ready inventory of future supply. In the Bakken, the 2017 completion of the Dakota Access Pipeline, which drew international attention due to protests, provided a critical outlet for that region's production (Institute for Energy Research 2018).
The growth of U.S. crude oil exports has been a transformative development following the lifting of the 40-year export ban in December 2015. Exports more than doubled from 465,000 barrels per day in 2015 to nearly 1.2 million barrels per day in 2017. By mid-2019, monthly exports were regularly exceeding 3 million barrels per day. This policy shift enhanced global and domestic market efficiency by allowing the U.S. to better align its crude oil slate with refinery configurations. Most complex U.S. refineries are optimized for processing heavier, sour crude, while much of the new domestic production is light and sweet. Consequently, the U.S. has increased imports of heavier grades that match its refinery needs while exporting surplus light crude to international markets, a practice known as crude swapping (Institute for Energy Research 2018).
Alongside Canada and Russia, Venezuela holds the world's largest proven reserves of the heavy crude oil that American refineries are designed to process (Institute for Energy Research 2018) making it a target for Trump’s oil supply due to its proximity to the U.S and location at U.S backyard as defined by the Monroe Doctrine.
Great Power Competition and Global Influence
The rationale for the U.S. intervention is multifaceted, with a clear divergence between official justifications and geostrategic imperatives. The administration’s stated objectives were aimed to combat narcotics and terrorism, with Attorney General Pam Bondi stating that seized oil tankers were used in illegal oil shipments supporting foreign terrorist groups (Radio Canada International 2025).
The geostrategic motivations reveal a more complex global power dynamics in a rapidly changing world order, from unipolar to a multi-polar international system. Analysts argue the intervention represents a modern, aggressive corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, explicitly framed in the new U.S. National Security Strategy as ensuring U.S. pre-eminence in the Western Hemisphere (Friedman 2025). The invasion serves as a stark demonstration to all regional states that challenges to U.S. dominance, especially through alliances with rivals like Russia and China, will be met with overwhelming force. This reassertion of hegemony is aimed at rolling back two decades of perceived encroachment by other great powers (China and Russia) with Venezuela as the primary battleground (Messari, 2025).
U.S pressure to prevent China and Russia influence in South America.
Official U.S. strategy documents, such as the 2018 National Defence Strategy, formally designate China, and Russia as the principal challengers to the American-led international order. This strategic concern is widely reflected across the U.S. foreign policy establishment. Analysts like Robert Evan Ellis of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) typify a consensus that encourages a more assertive U.S. posture to counter China's expanding influence in Latin America, viewing it as a direct challenge within a U.S.-shaped global system. The resulting geopolitical rivalry has prompted what observers term a "Monroe Doctrine 2.0," a modern strategic framework aimed at reasserting U.S. primacy and countering Chinese and Russian activities in a region Washington considers its sphere of influence.
This contemporary doctrine represents a clear shift, explicitly seeking to restore American control and "deny non-Hemispheric competitors the ability to position forces or to own or control strategically vital assets." Its practical application has been demonstrated through actions like the significant U.S. naval deployment to Venezuela's coast in late 2025 and efforts to reactivate regional security pacts like the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR) to manage crises where, as in Venezuela, Russian and Chinese support for the Maduro regime has complicated U.S. policy (Pires and Nascimento 2020).
China's engagement in South America is predominantly economic, driven by the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and an immense demand for natural resources to drive its development. China has provided approximately $138 billion in loans to the region, financing critical infrastructure projects such as Peru's mega-port of Chancay. This addresses a profound regional development gap. However, this lending model - often involving resource-secured loans without the conditionalities typical of Western institutions - has ignited a fierce debate about the economic viability of the projects and sustainable debt. U.S. officials frequently warn of "debt-trap diplomacy," arguing that Beijing seeks to create long-term dependency and gain strategic leverage. Proponents of this perspective points to cases like Ecuador, where loans for major projects are repaid through future oil shipments. Critics of the "debt-trap" narrative counter that saddling partners with unsustainable debt creates financial and diplomatic liabilities for China itself, undermining its broader strategic goals. The dynamic is evolving as China transitions from a generous lender to a more pragmatic debt manager amid regional economic strains (Pires and Nascimento 2020).
In contrast, Russia's strategy is overtly geopolitical and military, focused on gaining leverage against the U.S. Its partnership with Venezuela is the cornerstone of this effort. The Russian state oil company Rosneft has invested over $13 billion in Venezuelan assets, becoming the country's main international oil trader and a crucial economic lifeline for the Maduro government. In return, Russia secured a strategic foothold, conducting joint military exercises and selling over $4 billion in advanced arms, including combat aircraft and missile systems, to Caracas. For Moscow, supporting Caracas serves as a direct counterbalance to U.S. influence in regions Russia considers its own "near abroad," marking its most significant military-diplomatic intervention in the Western Hemisphere since the Cold War (Pires and Nascimento 2020).
The convergence of these powers has created several distinct points of friction. A primary flashpoint is the diplomatic competition over Taiwan, where Chinese activism has successfully shifted the recognition of several Central American and Caribbean nations long aligned with Washington. The U.S. has responded with measures like the TAIPEI Act, which mandates consequences for governments that abandon Taiwan. Simultaneously, a parallel "technology war" is underway over which companies will build Latin America's 5G telecommunications networks, a contest framing the larger U.S.-China rivalry over future technological standards and security. Furthermore, the U.S. consistently frames China's Belt and Road Initiative not as benign development finance but as a geostrategic project for dominance, employing diplomatic and public campaigns to warn countries of the risks of over-reliance on Chinese financing (Pires and Nascimento 2020).
U-S Domestic Politics
Domestically, the intervention is heavily shaped by factional politics within the second Trump administration and its base. Key figures like Secretary of State Marco Rubio, a long-time advocate for regime change in both Venezuela and Cuba, provided ideological grounding for the action, framing it as a final reckoning with "socialist dictatorships" in America's backyard (Sarat, 2025). Furthermore, the action plays to a powerful domestic narrative of demonstrating unwavering American strength and decisiveness. For the administration, a successful military operation offers a clear victory, contrasting with complex diplomatic engagements and serving as a central theme for the upcoming political cycle (Nicholasen, 2025). As scholar Steven Levitsky notes, Venezuela itself is not a core strategic priority, suggesting the administration's actions are driven more by personalistic and factional motives than by national interest. Thus, while publicly sold as a security imperative, the invasion is equally a function of ideological conviction and domestic political performance (Nicholasen, 2025).
Global and Regional Response
The international response reveals a fractured world along familiar geopolitical lines as some South American leaders made strong condemnation while some were supportive of the U.S invasion of Venezuela and the capture of President Maduro. Colombia’s President Gustavo Petro called for an emergency UN Security Council meeting, labelling the attack bombing with missiles. Cuba, Iran, and Russia denounced the action as a criminal violation of sovereignty and state terrorism (Angell, 2025). Argentine President Javier Milei celebrated Maduro's capture as "liberty advances". In U.S., the invasion was met with scepticism – a sign political party rift - as Democratic Senator Brian Schatz warned the U.S. has no vital national interests in Venezuela to justify war, while Republican Senator Mike Lee questioned the operation's constitutional justification (Sarat, 2025).
Within Venezuela, the situation remains volatile. Opposition leader María Corina Machado had previously expressed strong support for Trump's pressure strategy. However, the transition to a post-Maduro government is fraught. Défense Minister Padrino López vowed to resist the invasion, and the powerful military, deeply entrenched in the economy and the Petróleos de Venezuela SA (PDVSA) - a state-owned fully integrated oil and gas company, could become a spoiler. The potential for a chaotic and violent internal power struggle is high.
Conclusion
The U.S. invasion of Venezuela and the capture of its President mark a return to an overt, unilateral gunboat diplomacy not seen in South America for decades (Sarat, 2025) setting a new and dangerous precedent in geopolitical rivalry in the region in which great powers could do whatever they wish to protect their national security interests at the expense of less powerful states, with the potential of arms race and nuclear proliferation by weak states as deterrence to guarantee their sovereignty and survival as the international system seems more anarchic as described by Professor John Mearsheimer in his theory of defensive realism. It establishes a dangerous precedent where the United States, citing transnational crime or terrorism, justifies the overthrow of a sovereign government and the seizure of its natural resources. While the immediate goal of removing Nicolás Maduro may have been achieved, the ultimate objectives—a stable, friendly Venezuela and the secure flow of its oil—are far from guaranteed. The operation has ignited a political and humanitarian crisis in Venezuela, alienated key regional partners, and introduced a massive new variable into the global energy dynamics. The true cost of the invasion will be measured not in the short-term military success, but in the long-term stability of the region and the future of international law.
The revival of a Monroe Doctrine-style framework signifies the full return of great power competition to South America. Yet, the U.S. strategy of seeking to exclude rivals faces significant challenges as it risks provoking regional backlash and mistrust by invoking a history of interventionism that is deeply resented. Moreover, it may be economically impractical; China is South America's leading trade partner, and simply blocking its investment without offering large-scale, competitive alternatives could leave a critical infrastructure deficit. The ultimate outcome of this contest will depend less on the force of any external doctrine and more on which power can offer partnerships that genuinely align with South America's own aspirations for sustainable development and sovereignty.
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